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INTRODUCTION 
 
Small Medium enterprises are acknowledged 
as important business entities that contribute 
to the world economy (Chu, 2009). In 
Indonesian context, small medium 
enterprises (SMEs) contribute significantly to 
the Indonesian economy through providing 
job employment, export contributions, and 
poverty reduction (Mawardi, Choi, & Perera, 
2011; Tambunan, 2008). According to the 
Indonesian Ministry of Cooperation and Small 
scale Enterprises (2012), the number of 
SMEs (including micro sized) in Indonesia in 
2012 was 56,539,560 and contributing 
4,869,568.1 million rupiah of gross product 
domestic (GDP) and  employing 110,808,154 
people.  They represent 99.9 per cent of all 
enterprises. Most SMEs in Indonesia are 
private and family owned (Patrick, 2001).  
Research related to governance in family 
SMEs is necessary since governance is one 
of essential factors that contribute to 
business performance (Dyer 2006; Mazzi 
2011). Governance in family SMEs is also 
important since this mechanism “...can 
potentially be a value destroying or value-
creating” (Goel, Jussila, & Ikaheimonen, 
2014). Governance can make family 
involvement become “asset” or “liabilities” for 
the firms (Dyer, 2006). Assets, in one hand 
can increase firm’s performance. Liabilities, 
on the other hand, can decrease firm’s 
performance (Dyer, 2006).  
One of the important governance issues in 
family firms is governance mechanism 
efficiency (Nordqvist, Sharma & Chirico 
2014). There has been many attempts to 
searchi efficient governance in family 
business literature focus on internal 
framework environment (Basco & Rodriguest 
2009; Memili, Chrisman & Chua 2011). 
These include the investigation of ownership 
structure and goals’ process that lead to 
efficiency of governance (Mazzi 2011; 
Nordqvist et al. 2014; Pieper, Klein & 
Jaskiewicz, 2008). These issues dominate 
the discussion about family business’ 
governance for long period through agency 
perspective (Chrisman, Chua & Sharma 
2005; Gersick & Feliu 2014; Shukla, Carney 
& Gedajlovic 2014). Nevertheless, efficiency 
of governance is not only resulting of internal 
activities but also from the interaction 
between firms and their environment through 
inter-organisational exchange (Verbeke & 
Kano 2012). Recent work has recognized 
that formal and relational governance is 
important aspect in understanding 
governance efficiency in family firms (Calabro 
& Mussolino 2011; Mustakallio, Autio & Zahra 
2002; Uhlaner, Floren & Geerling 2007). 
This study aim to investigate the 
connection between uncertainty, trust and 
governance mechanisme particularly in 
developing country, particularly in  Indonesia. 
Recent literature indicates that component of 
relational such as trust can be substitute or 
complement toward formal governances 
(Mellewigt, Madhok & Weibel 2007; Poppo & 
Zenger 2002). Information about the 
substitute and complement of trust to formal 
governance, may become an entry point to 
reveal when family SMEs should apply 
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relational and formal governance. Costa and 
Bijlsma-Frankema (2007 p.397) pointed out 
“low trust requires formal control and high 
trust allows for limited formal control. 
However, recent literature (Costa  & Bijlsma-
Frankema 2007; Poppo & Zenger 2002 
&Mellewigt et al. 2007) discus trust and 
formal governance in general context without 
distinguishing size or types of business 
(family and non family business). 
Furthermore, the literature does not take into 
account the business dynamic of SMEs into 
the application of relational and formal 
governance mechanism. It leads to speculate 
that not only trust need to be investigated to 
reveal the appropriateness of the application 
of governance mechanism in family SMEs 
but also organizational complexity as impact 
of the dynamic of business. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Governance mechanism 
 
In regards with inter-firms relationship, the 
increasing of exchange hazard can 
encourage managers to choose one of on 
two options: formal and relational 
governance. Formal governance suggests 
that a complete contract is appropriate to 
overcome the increasing of exchange risk 
(Sheng, Brown, Nicholson &Poppo 2006; 
Zhou et al. 2008). It has been suggested that 
detail contract is able to handle disagreement 
due to the increasing of exchange risk 
(Barthelemy&Quelin 2006). However, 
because of bounded rationality, it is 
impossible to make a complete contract 
(Geyskens et al. 2006). As a consequence, 
when the environment uncertainty increase, 
the term in contracts might no longer 
sufficient to govern the transactions (Carson 
et al. 2006).  
The main function of formal contract is to 
protect business exchange from the 
opportunism (Williamson 1985) and 
enhancing relationship (Liu, Luo & Liu 2009). 
Formal contract use written contract that 
specify promises or obligation for each party 
that involve in transaction (Lamothe & 
Lamothe 2012; Poppo & Zenger 2002). 
Formal contract emphasizes on “detailed, 
binding legal agreements that specifies the 
obligations and roles of both parties in 
relationship” (Vandaele et al. 2007 p.240). 
Formal contract giving direction about how 
future contingency could be handled (Liu, Luo 
& Liu 2009). This is in line with what 
Williamson (1999 p.1090) suggested 
“credible contracting is very much an 
exercise in farsighted contracting, whereby 
the parties look ahead, recognized hazards, 
and devise hazard mitigating responses ─ 
thereby to realize mutual gain”. 
Formal governance operates under incentive 
and sanction mechanism (Ghoshal & Moran 
1996). Given bounded rationality and 
information asymmetric, principals are less 
likely to design perfect contract that create 
loophole to agents to become opportunist 
(Gomez-Meija et al. 2001). Because there is 
a potential of the economic actors to abuse 
their mandate, then incentive and sanction 
mechanism are integral parts of this 
mechanism (Ghoshal & Moran 1996).Thus 
sanction is a tool to limit risk of economic 
agentsbehaviour (Ghoshal & Moran 1998). 
Furthermore, economic actor will tend to be 
cooperate and avoid opportunistic actions if 
there is a clear sanction in the contractual 
agreement (Lubatkin et al. 2007; Poppo& 
Zenger 2002). In agency theory, financial 
incentives are viewed as sufficient incentives 
to align interest of agents with interest of 
owners (Lubatkin, Jane, Collin & Very 2007).   
Formal governance is associated with the 
application of formal contract and 
administrative control. Formal contract use 
written contract that specify promises or 
obligation for each party that involve in 
transaction (Lamothe & Lamothe 2012; 
Poppo & Zenger 2002). Formal governance 
emphasizes on “detailed, binding legal 
agreements that specifies the obligations and 
roles of both parties in relationship” 
(Vandaele et al. 2007 p.240). This 
mechanism belief that sanction mechanism 
will reduce the motivation to conduct 
opportunistic behaviour (Ghosal & Moran 
1996). Ghosal and Moran (1996) call this 
mechanism as “rational control”. This 
mechanism assumes that each party have a 
self interest in nature and will conduct 
opportunistic behaviour except parties make 
formal arrangement to restrict opportunism 
(Ghosal & Moran 1996). Formal control 
emphasizes rational and calculative 
approach. This mechanism uses reward and 
sanction to control people behaviour 
(Ghoshal & Moran 1996). This approach sees 
human being as independent entity who has 
a goal and capability to calculate every action 
to achieve their goals (Coleman 1988). 
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Uncertainty and formal  governance 
mechanism 
 
Many scholars link the governance 
mechanism with external factors, in 
particular, uncertainty (Peng & Jiang 2010; 
Peng & Luo 2000; Zhou, Poppo & Yang 
2008; Zhou, Li, Zhao & Cai 2003).Uncertainty 
arises if the situation surrounding an 
exchange is unpredictable. Due to this factor, 
contract cannot easily be specified and 
performance is difficult to verify (Geysken et 
al. 2006).Uncertainty contributes to increased 
transaction risk since formal contracts might 
cannot completely cover the situations 
surrounding a transaction (Zhou et al. 2008). 
The limitation of people to absorbs, process 
information and predicts information in -
bounded rationality- means that contracts are 
always incomplete in a nature and therefore 
lead to adaptability problems related to 
environmental uncertainty (Carson et al. 
2006).Uncertainty also leads to renegotiation 
of contracts and the searching new business 
partners that are associated to cost of 
transactions (Crook et al. 2013). 
Uncertainty encompasses three 
dimensions: volume uncertainty, technology 
uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty 
(Crook et al. 2013). Volume uncertainty refers 
to the difficulty in predicting the availability of 
product required for transactors, 
technological uncertainty refers to the extent 
to which current technology will become 
obsolete due to technologically advancement 
(Arranz&Arroyabe 2011). Behavioural 
uncertainty refers to the difficulty in 
evaluating performance of product delivered 
(Vandaele et al. 2007). 
Many discussions about uncertainty and 
governance mechanism are located in area 
inter-firms relationship. In inter-firms 
relationship the main consequence of 
uncertainty adaptation problems (Geyskens 
et al. 2006). An existing contract may not 
cover unanticipated situations surrounding 
the exchange (Noorderweir et al.1997). This 
means that contract cannot easily be 
specified and performance is difficult to verify 
(Geyskens et al. 2006). The limitation of 
people to absorbs, process information and 
predicts information in -bounded rationality- 
means that contracts are always incomplete 
in a nature and therefore lead to adaptability 
problems related to environmental 
uncertainty (Carson et al. 2006). High levels 
of uncertainty increases the costs of adapting 
the contractual agreement (Rindfleisch & 
Heide 1997). Uncertainty also leads to 
renegotiation of contracts and the searching 
new business partners that are associated to 
cost of transactions (Crook et al. 2013). 
Neoclassical approach suggests that the 
extensive contract is appropriate for 
responding uncertainty (Carson et al. 2006). 
Conversely, sociological approach view that 
emphasis on relational mechanism is 
appropriate to deal with uncertainty. The 
main idea is that social enforcement can 
mitigate against opportunism and facilitate 
cooperative behaviour (Carson et al. 2006). 
Pollak (1985) suggest that family firms are 
appropriate to implement family governance 
or relational governance when the uncertainty 
that refers to complexity is low. Similarly, 
Gedajlovic et al. (2004) suggests that when 
environment becomes more complex, 
organisation are required to adopt formal 
governance by implementing formal routines 
and coordinating their main activities. Formal 
routines and coordination are most suitably 
carried out by specialists and professionals 
hired to handle complex organisational tasks. 
It has been suggested that uncertainty leads 
to authority delegation (Miller 1992). 
 
H1: A positive relationship exist between 
uncertainty and the application of formal 
governance in family SMEs 
 
Trust in inter-firm relationships 
 
In one definition, trust refers to “the 
expectation that another organization can be 
relied on to fulfil its obligations, to behave in a 
predictable manner and to act and negotiate 
fairly evenly when the possibility of 
opportunism is present”(Gulati, Ranjay & 
Nickerson 2008, p. 167).  Trust in business 
generally refers to the “expression of 
confidence between the parties in an 
exchange” (Jones & George 1998, p. 531). 
Mayer, Davis & Schoorman (1995 p.172) 
propose the definition of trust as ” individual 
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that 
the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or to control that other 
party”. People trust others because they 
expect that others will behave in a particular 
way (Mayer et al. 1995) that produces the 
favourable outcome (Cristina Costa & 
Bijlsma-Frankema 2007).  
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Family firms have been associated with a 
high level of trust within the organization 
(Corbetta & Salvato 2004; Eddleston et al. 
2010). Special relationships based on blood 
and love (Kepner 1983), similarity of “family 
identity” (Zellweger et al. 2011) and 
“language” (Davis, Allen & Hayes 2010) 
encourage trusting relationships in family 
firms. The long term relationship among 
family members also creates trust in family 
firms (Eddleston et al.2010). The internal 
relationships within families, characteristized 
by “face to face interaction, positive affection, 
mutual support and altruistic feeling among 
family members” (Zellwegger et al. 2011 p.5), 
potentially facilitates trusting relationships in 
family firms. 
Trust in family firms is the result of the 
extension of social interactions within the 
families (Steier & Muenthel 2014). Social 
interaction in families inherently cultivates 
trusting relationship since they have special 
relationships based on blood and love 
(Kepner 1983), similarity of “family identity” 
(Zelwegger et al. 2011) and “language” 
(Davis, Allen & Hayes 2010). Building trust is 
part of the affection process that begins in 
infancy as parents (or other primary 
caregivers) care for and provide the needs of 
young children for food, warmth, comfort, 
love, security, and human response (Bubolz 
2001). In family firms, trust is an essential 
basis for cooperation and provides firms 
competitiveness (Steier 2001). Trust is 
important in family firms since it stimulates 
cooperation within and between firms. As 
Steier and Muenthel 2014 (p.498) note ” 
familial trust provides an essential lubricant 
that facilitates exchange relationship”. Trust 
can be transferred from family affiliations to 
the work environment, and through the 
development of personal relationships into 
business exchanges (Salvato & Melin 2008). 
The relationship between firm and their 
stakeholder often rely on trust rather than 
formal contract (Gedjalovic & Carney 2010; 
Memili  et al. 2011a; Verbeke & Kano 
2010).Connections between family firms and 
their suppliers and customers are often 
stronger and more valuable those of non-
family firms (Lyman 1991). A good 
relationship with other stakeholder can 
produce bridging social capital (Gedjalovic 
and Carney 2010). Family firm can built 
relationships with other parties whom they did 
not know previously, through current 
connections. A good connection between 
family firms and stakeholder is often 
connected with stakeholder efficiencies 
(Aronoff & Ward 1995). 
Trust has been acknowledged as an 
essential element in cooperation between 
individuals, groups and organizations 
(Gambetta 1988; Jones & George 1998; 
Zaheer, McEvily & Peronne 1998; Fulmer & 
Gelfand 2012). The success of any form of 
collaboration needs a minimum level of trust 
(Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema 2007). When 
people working together, the outcome 
cooperation is not only depend on one party’s 
performance but also others parties’ 
performance (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 
1995). Therefore, they need to trust one 
another. However, people cannot ensure that 
business partners will always behave in ways 
that are in line organizational goals, 
therefore, trust is risky (Das 1998). Even 
though trust is associated with risk taking 
behaviour, people may decide to collaborate 
because they have confidence in the future 
prospect of collaboration (Das &Teng 1998).  
In economic exchange, when people trust 
one another, they do not need formal control 
to ensure that the other party will not engage 
misconduct behaviour (Mellewigt, Madhok & 
Weibel 2007a; Puranam, P. & Vanneste, B. 
S. 2009). In relationship exchange, trust 
minimizes coordination complexity and 
conflicts due to the future uncertainty and 
bounded rationality that inevitable exist 
(Gulati et al. 2005; Puranam & Vanneste 
2009). High levels of trust, do not only 
decrease the need to monitor performance, 
but also eliminate the need to use a system 
control based on a short term performance 
orientation that does not support innovation 
and cooperation (Hosmer 1995).  
Literature suggests that in the situation 
where people have a low trust towards formal 
institutions, as in Indonesia, personal 
relationships are more likely to be used to 
reduce uncertainty (Rademakers 1998). In 
addition, by relying on relational ties with 
Indonesian state officers, for instance, people 
can get facilities that can only be accessed 
by limited persons (Rademakers 1998). This 
is because state officers have the authority to 
manage rules of the game that favour their 
business partners (Rademakers 1998). 
Rademaker (1998) also found that in 
Javanese business, authority is located and 
centralized into a person. Because of strong 
personal influence, informality is more salient 
than formality in business relationships. 
Because of this tendency, personal 
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relationship with is more relevant rather than 
contract, formal procedures, and formal rules. 
Some scholars indicate that level of trust 
(Mellewigt, Madhok & Weibel 2007b; Poppo 
& Zenger 2002) can be used to signal the 
application of the governance mechanism. In 
economic exchange, when people trust one 
another, they are less likely to use formal 
controls to assure that the other party will not 
engage in misconduct (Mellewigt, Madhok & 
Weibel 2007b; Puranam, P. & Vanneste, B.S. 
2009). High levels of trust have been 
connected with the low intention to use formal 
governance mechanisms (Mellewigt, Madhok 
& Weibel 2007b; Poppo & Zenger 2002).  
Adam & Tisdell (2008) conducted 
research about inter-firm cooperation among 
small-medium enterprises (SMES) in the 
garment industry in Bandung, Indonesia. 
They found that trust and competency are 
essential factors that promote cooperation in 
inter-firm relationships. Trustworthy and 
competent partners encourage firms to 
maintain long-term relationships. They found 
that inter-firm relationships increased 
capabilities in marketing and production and 
reduced transaction costs. They reported that 
continuity of business cooperation is found 
among firms that initially use repeated 
business contacts and family connections. 
 
H2: The relationship between uncertainty 
and formal governance is weaker when 
high trust exists 
 
METHODS  
 
Data collection was conducted from 
November 2013 until January 2014 through 
questionnaires which were hand delivered to 
family business owners or managers of family 
SMEs. Research assistants visited 
respondents and help them fill out structured 
questionnaires, since not all family business 
owners have good literacy and understanding 
about business terminology. Before 
respondents filled out the questionnaires, 
consent forms were given to respondents. 
The process of filling out the questionnaires 
took between 50-70 minutes on average. 
Data collected by research assistants were 
cross checked by researchers to ensure the 
questionnaires were completed. In the case 
where questionnaires were not completed, 
research assistants contacted respondents 
through phone calls and asked respondents 
to address the missing questions. 
This study follows a quantitative research 
approach in which data were coded, 
calculated and quantified in order to 
understand the concepts represented 
(Creswell 2009). Quantitative research 
emphasizes the examination of relationships 
between variables that function to test the 
objective of theories (Creswell 2002).  
This study adopts a positivist view as a 
research paradigm. The positive paradigm 
views that reality exists and follows a natural 
law (Neuman 2014). In administering the 
survey, researchers asked the same 
questions to many respondents (Neuman 
1997, p.250). From the data collected from 
the survey samples the researcher is able to 
make generalizations about the 
characteristics of the population (Creswell 
2009). Survey is an efficient method because 
it reaches a high number of respondents in a 
limited time (Neuman 2014).  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
The definition of trust in this research refers 
toMayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) and 
Zaheer dan Venkatraman (1995). Meyer et 
Table 1. 
Items in trust measurement 
 
Questions Loading Factors Cronbach Likert Scale 
Trust    
Our enterprise and supplier(s) share mutual 
trust 
0.734  1=Do not agree 
at all 
5=Totally agree In decision making, our enterprise and 
supplier(s) are concerned about each other 
interests 
0.583  
Our enterprise and our selected buyers 
have mutual trust 
0.744  
In decision making, our enterprise and 
selected buyer(s) are concerned about each 
other interests 
0.729  
The people in our enterprise are honest and 
truthful 
0.34  
  0.751  
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al. (1995) define trust as ”an individual 
willingness to be vulnerable to another party 
and the expectation that an exchange partner 
will not behave opportunistically even when 
such behaviour cannot be detected” (p. 712). 
While in contrast to Zaheer and Venkatraman 
who focus solely on the inter-organizational 
relationship dimension of trust, this research 
also looks within firms. This research used 
the instrument of trust from (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman 1995). The score of Cronbach 
Alpha in this construct was 0.751.  
This study predicts that the effect of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and formal 
governance is moderated by level of trust. 
The different situations of trust will have 
consequences on the relationship between 
asset specificity, uncertainty and governance 
mechanism. When the level of trust is low, 
the relationship between asset specificity, 
uncertainty and governance mechanism is 
strong. Conversely, when the level of trust is 
high, the relationship between asset 
specificity and uncertainty on formal 
governance is weak. 
To test a moderating variable, this study 
follows procedural testing suggested by Lee 
& Cavusgil (2006) that was adopted from 
Sharma et al (1981). According to Lee & 
Cavusgil (2006), to test moderating variables, 
data are separated into two groups based on 
the level of attribute of moderator variable 
(low-high) and then were regressed. Next, a 
Chow Test was employed to test differences 
of regression analysis between two groups. If 
the differences between the two regression 
analyses is significant, we may conclude that 
the factor that made the difference is the 
moderating variable. 
Hypothesis  G and H predicts trust as a 
moderating variable.  
Y1= α +b11X11+ b12X12 + b13X13+ εi 
Y2= α +b12X21+ b22X22 + b32X32+ εi 
and then Chow test is conducted to test the 
difference of regression analysis. 
Chow test formula : 
F=    
                  
                  
 
RSSc=Residual sum square combination 
RSS1= Regression analysis 1 
RSS2= Regression analysis 2 
n=sample size 
k=parameter 
The result showed the difference influence 
of uncertainty on formal governance in high 
and low trust situation. When trust was high, 
uncertainty has negative and significant 
impact on formal governance (p<0.5, t=-
2.372). In contrast, when trust was low, 
uncertainty has no significant impact on 
formal governance (p>0.5, t=-0.150). Bases 
on this result, trust moderate relationship 
between  uncertainty and formal governance. 
Whilst, the result demonstrated that there 
was no different influence of asset specificity 
on formal governance in high and low trust 
situation. Asset specificity has significantly 
impact on both high and low trust situation. 
Similar result was found for relational 
governance. When the level of trust was high, 
uncertainty has negatively significant impact 
on relational governance (p< 0.01, t=-2.93). 
But, when the level of trust was low,  
uncertainty did not have significant impact to 
relational governance (p>0.5 t=-.613). 
Formal governance: 
RSS  entire=172.556 
RSS1= 89.119 
RSS2=110.365 
Table 2. 
Testing for Moderation effect of Trust 
 
  
 Formal governance 
 High (trust) Low  (trust) 
Independent 
variables 
  
Asset specificity .492*** .402*** 
Uncertainty -.527** -.033 
Control variables   
Industry Size .100 .341 
Firm’s Ages .176 .077 
Firm’s Types .145 -.015 
Firm’s Leadership -.040 -.278 
Chow Test (F8, 315)  
*** p <0.01 
** p <0.5 
* p <0.1 
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RSS entire= 89.119 +110.365 = 199.484 
 F=  
                          
                 
 
=
                   
          
 
=
            
    
 
=163.18 
F table,  α=5%,  F(3,∞ )=8.53 
 
The result of Chow-Test indicates that the 
F test (163.18) was bigger than  F table 
(8.53). The moderation testing indicates that 
trust moderate the relationship between 
uncertainty and formal governance. In the 
high trust situation, the impact of uncertainty 
on formal governance was negatively 
significant. It means that when people have 
high trust, firms who transact in uncertainty 
environment have less required formal 
governance. 
This result bring us to the on going 
discussions about the relationship between 
trust and formal control. The first issue is 
about substitute and complementary between 
trust and formal control (Poppo & Zenger 
2002; Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007). In 
substitution point of view,  trust is opposite 
with formal control (Costa and Bijlsma-
Frankema 2007). Low trust leads to high 
formal control. In contrast,  high trust wil bring 
to low formal control.  Costa (2003) found 
that trust positively related with cooperative 
behavior among teamwork and negatively 
related with monitoring activities of teamwork 
members that demonstrating trust as 
substitute of formal control. In complementary 
views, trust can strengthen formal control 
(Mellewigt et al. 2007; Sitkin, 1995). Formal 
control can enhance trust to the level that 
enabling parties to make cooperation 
between them (Mellewigt et al. 2007). 
The second issue about direct and indirect 
effect of trust on formal governance. In 
contrast to mainstrem that divide the 
relationship of trust and control as substitute 
and complementary, Mellewigt et al. (2007) 
suggested that trust is moderate the 
connection between asset specificity and 
complexity of contract. According to Mellewigt 
et al. (2007), the relationship between of 
contractual complexity and asset specificity 
will be weaker when trust is high. Almost the 
same,  this research posit that trust will 
moderate the connection between asset 
specificity and formal governance. However, 
the result shows that asset specificity lead to 
the application of relational and formal 
governance. Thus complementary effect of 
trust and formal governance is more salient 
rather than moderation effect.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This study found that uncertainty was a 
determinant for governance mechanism used 
in family SMEs. It means that a combination 
of formal and relational governance is a 
major respond uncertainty for SMEs in 
Indonesia. This research also indicates that 
trust moderate relationship between  
uncertainty and formal governance. It can be 
seen from fact that the difference influence of 
uncertainty on formal governance in high and 
low trust situation. When trust was high, 
uncertainty has negative and significant 
impact on formal governance. 
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